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Abstract
The safety and robustness of learning-based decision-making systems are under
threats from adversarial examples, as imperceptible perturbations can mislead
neural networks to completely different outputs. In this paper, we present an adap-
tive view of the issue via evaluating various test-time smoothing defense against
white-box untargeted adversarial examples. Through controlled experiments with
pretrained ResNet-152 on ImageNet, we first illustrate the non-monotonic relation
between adversarial attacks and smoothing defenses. Then at the dataset level, we
observe large variance among samples and show that it is easy to inflate accuracy
(even to 100%) or build large-scale (i.e., with size 104) subsets on which a desig-
nated method outperforms others by a large margin. Finally at the sample level, as
different adversarial examples require different degrees of defense, the potential
advantages of iterative methods are also discussed. We hope this paper reveal
useful behaviors of test-time defenses, which could help improve the evaluation
process for adversarial robustness in the future.
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples have brought uncertainties and threatened the robustness and safety of
learning-based decision-making systems, especially for autonomous driving [1][2][3] and robotic
systems[4][5][6], in which perception is served as important inputs to the entire system. As an
intriguing property first found in [7], carefully computed perturbations on inputs could lead to mis-
classification with high confidence, even though the perturbations are imperceptible to humans. Over
the past few years, researchers have developed a number of adversarial attacks [8][9][10] on classifi-
cation systems, which show the underlying instability for decision making with deep networks. In
later studies, noisy patterns are observed in the feature maps of adversarial examples [11]. Motivated
by the noisy pattern, we explore the possibility of defense with various smoothing techniques at test
time. Instead of proving the superiority of a particular method, the focus of this paper is to reveal
the adaptive characteristic of adversarial robustness. Meanwhile, the test-time smoothing methods
discussed in this paper can still complement other defense schemes such as adversarial training [8].
The contributions of this paper are:
• We implement a test-time defense pipeline which can smooth both the original inputs and
intermediate outputs from any specified layer(s). This pipeline can be generalized to study
the influence of intermediate layers in various tasks.
∗Equal contribution
Workshop on Safety and Robustness in Decision Making, 33rd Conference on Neural Information Processing
Systems (NeurIPS 2019), Vancouver, Canada.
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• We present the non-monotonic relation between adversarial attacks and smoothing defenses:
For a fixed attack, the successful defense rate first increases then decreases as smoothing
becomes stronger. For a fixed defense, the classification accuracy on adversarial examples
first drops then rebounds as the number of attack iterations increases.
• We conduct the first investigation on the performance of defense on each test sample. The
variance among samples is so large that it becomes easy to select large (i.e., at scale 104)
subsets from ImageNet [12] validation set, allowing a designated method to outperform
others, or even to inflate 100% accuracy.
• We demonstrate that different adversarial examples require different degrees of defense at
test time and illustrate the potential benefits of iterative defenses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related studies. Section 3 explains the
methodology of test-time defense with various smoothing techniques. Sections 4 and 5 follow with
experiments and discussion, respectively.
All relevant materials that accompany this paper, including both the codes and pre-computed data,
are publicly available at GitHub2 and Dropbox3.
2 Related work
Since the discovery of adversarial examples, researchers have been working on methods of attacking
or securing neural networks. We can roughly categorize the attacks with multiple criteria such as
white-box or black-box, targeted or untargeted, and one-shot or iterative [13]. On the defenders’ side,
two major strategies [14] have been adopted in current practice: (1) reinforcing the classifier during
training time so that it accounts for adversarial examples and (2) detecting and converting adversarial
examples back to normal at test time. A comprehensive survey on adversarial examples is available
in [15]. It is worth stating that fooling machine-learning algorithms with adversarial examples is
much easier than designing models that cannot be fooled [16]. One can even fool a neural network
with very few pixels [17]. For efficiency purpose, most existing attacks utilize gradient information
of the network and “optimally” perturb the image to maximize the loss function. The noisy pattern
might be a side-effect of such a gradient-based operation.
In this paper, we limit our scope to white-box untargeted attacks, which is the most common type in
literature. Compared with the feature denoising in [11], all our smoothing defenses are performed at
test time. We assume that the neural-network classifier has already been shipped and deployed, or it
might not be feasible to retrain with adversarial examples. In addition, we believe test-time defenses
studied in this paper can also serve as a useful complimentary post-processing procedure, even when
adversarial training is affordable. Contrary to existing work which often compares methods at dataset
level with static configurations (e.g., a few sets of fixed parameters), we thoroughly investigate the
behavior of test-time defenses at multiple levels and with varying strength. Smoothing methods
are selected for illustration because their strength can be naturally measured using the number of
iterations or radius of kernels.
3 Methodology
In this section, we elaborate the general test-time defense scheme and all relevant smoothing tech-
niques that we experiment with.
3.1 Test-time defense scheme
Let f : X → Y denote a pretrained classifier that maps an image x ∈ X to its label y ∈ Y . An
adversarial attack g : X → X then maps a legitimate image x to an adversarial example xˆ under
certain constraints (e.g., on Lp distance) such that f(x) 6= f(xˆ) = f(g(x)). To defend adversarial
attacks at test time, an ideal solution would be applying the inverse mapping g−1 : xˆ 7→ x. In reality,
however, we have to find a defense h, which is an alternative approximation of g−1 with the hope
2https://github.com/mkt1412/testtime-smoothing-defense
3https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ayiyiboba5nyv2k/AAAYZffyD0CeY_1aOmrkrg8Ba?dl=0
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that f(x) = f(h(xˆ)) can be satisfied. In addition, a defense h is more desirable for deployment if it
brings less distortion to legitimate images x, keeping f(x) = f(h(x)). To achieve that, we may also
introduce a detector (as a part of h) that distinguishes adversarial examples from legitimate ones at
the first stage of the defense. Once an input is considered legitimate, no further defense is required.
In this work, we apply smoothing techniques as the alternative approximation (h) of the inverse
mapping (g−1) of the attack. Theoretically, the smoothing defense only works when outputs from an
adversarial attack (g) are “noisy,” which implies g ≈ h−1 from the perspective of f .
3.2 Smoothing techniques
The smoothing techniques involved can be categorized into three groups: common, edge-preserving,
and advanced. The common group includes mean, median and Gaussian filter, which are most
commonly used in image processing. Edge-preserving smoothing algorithms include anisotropic
diffusion and bilateral filter. More advanced smoothing techniques include non-local means and
modified curvature motion. We will explain concisely the algorithms in the following paragraphs.
Mean, median, and Gaussian filters: These filters are widely applied in image processing. Despite
the simple forms, they do not necessarily perform the worst in defending adversarial examples.
Anisotropic diffusion [18]: The Perona-Malik anisotropic diffusion aims at reducing image noise
without removing important edges by assigning lower diffusion coefficients for edge pixels (which
have larger gradient norm). During iterations, the image is updated according to the formula below.
It = div (c(x, y, t)∇I) = ∇c · ∇I + c(x, y, t)∆I
in which div denotes the divergence operator, ∆ denotes the Laplacian, and ∇ denotes the gradient.
The diffusion coefficient is defined either as c (‖∇I‖) = e−(‖∇I‖/K)2 or c (‖∇I‖) = 1
1+(‖∇I‖/K)2 .
Bilateral filter [19]: A bilateral filter is a non-linear edge-preserving filter that computes the filtered
value of a pixel p using weighted average of its neighborhood S. The filter can be expressed with the
following formula [20].
BF[I](p) =
1
W (p)
∑
q∈S
Gσs(‖p− q‖)Gσr (|I(p)− I(q)|) I(q)
in which W (p) =
∑
q∈S Gσs(‖p− q‖)Gσr (|I(p)− I(q)|) is the normalization term. Gσs and Gσr
are weight functions (e.g., Gaussian) for space and range, respectively. Edges are preserved because
pixels that fall on different sides of the edge will have lower weights for range.
Non-local means [21]: The non-local mean algorithm takes a more general form in which the output
value of a pixel i is computed as a average of all pixels in the image I , weighted by a similarity
w(i, j) which is measured as a decreasing function of the weighted Euclidean distance to that pixel.
For a discrete image v = {v(i) | i ∈ I}, the filtered value for a pixel i is computed as follows.
NL[v](i) =
∑
j∈I
w(i, j)v(i)
in which the weights w(i, j) = 1Z(i)e
− ‖v(Ni)−v(Nj)‖
2
2,a
h2 . In the formula, Nk denotes a square neigh-
borhood of fixed size centered at a pixel k, and a is the standard deviation of the Gaussian kernel.
The normalizing constant is computed as Z(i) =
∑
j e
− ‖v(Ni)−v(Nj)‖
2
2,a
h2 .
Modified curvature motion [22]: As most smoothing techniques are originally designed for gray-
scale images, generalizing them to multi-channel color images and feature maps might be less natural,
and sometimes there may exist multiple ways for the generalization. Instead of splitting a color image
into separate channels, we can treat it as a surface (x, y,R(x, y), G(x, y), B(x, y)) ⊂ R5. Following
the geometric property that smoother surfaces have smaller areas (or volumes), we can then iteratively
smooth it with a general curvature motion method:
It =
k−2∇2I + (I2y + I2z )Ixx + (I2x + I2z )Iyy + (I2x + I2y )Izz − 2(IxIyIxy + IxIzIxz + IyIzIyz)
(k−2 + ‖∇I‖2)2
where k is a scaling factor. As k becomes larger, the algorithm transits from isotropic to a more
edge-preserving diffusion. Such a formulation can be easily and naturally extended to feature maps
with more channels along the z axis.
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(a) PGD ( = 0.01, 20 iterations) (b) PGD ( = 0.05, 20 iterations)
Figure 1: Change of classification accuracy on ImageNet validation set (vertical) along with the
strength of smoothing defense (horizontal). The strength of smoothing method is measured by the
most sensitive parameter: number of iterations for anisotropic diffusion and modified curvature
motion, size of the kernel for mean filter, and radius of the neighborhood for bilateral filter.
4 Experiments
In this section, we present our experimental results of test-time smoothing against adversarial
examples. In order to prepare the test set, we first select all images (39,156 in total) that are correctly
classified by the pretrained ResNet-152 [23] . Then we generate and store adversarial examples using
attacks that are provided by Foolbox [24] and ART [25]. The white-box untargeted attacks include
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [26], Deep Fool[27], Saliency Map[10], Newton Fool [28], and
salt-and-pepper noise. For strong attacks (e.g., PGD) that cannot be mitigated by quantization, we
store the adversarial examples in jpeg format; for other attacks that require adversarial examples in
floating point accuracy, we store their results in pkl files. To save computation time for future work,
all generated data will be available for download.
4.1 Performance of various smoothing techniques on defending fixed adversarial attacks
We start with a set of controlled experiments that show the performance of various smoothing
techniques on defending a fixed attack. Two sets of PGD attacks, with maximum perturbation
 = 0.01 (imperceptible to humans) and  = 0.05 (similar scale as in [11]), are chosen as baseline
because (1) PGD attack is one of the strongest attacks and (2) adversarial examples from PGD attack
cannot be defended by simple quantization. Following the default settings, 20 iterations of PGD
are performed. After obtaining the perturbed images, we tweak the parameters in each smoothing
method to pursue the optimal ones that lead to the highest classification accuracy over all perturbed
images. If a method contains multiple parameters, we tweak them one after another and naively apply
the optimal parameter values obtained from previous exploration.
Figure 1 shows the classification accuracy on ImageNet validation set as the strength of smoothing
defenses varies. The strength is measured by the most sensitive parameter, that is, number of iterations
for iterative methods such as anisotropic diffusion and modified curvature motion, size of the kernel
for mean filters, and diameter of the neighborhood for bilateral filters. We only present results from
four selected methods because the rest of them lead to much lower (i.e., 20-30% less) classification
accuracy. Henceforth, we will focus on these four methods in subsequent sections.
The curves in Figure 1 share a similar concave shape, which might suggest a geometric relation
between adversarial attack g and test-time defense h. As illustrated by Figure 2(a), the test-time
defense should not travel too far along the “detour.” In the following subsection, we further study the
non-monotonic effect from the attackers’ perspective.
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(a) fixed attack g, varying defense h (b) varying attack g, fixed defense h
Figure 2: Simplified illustration on the “detour” effect between adversarial attack g and test-time
defense h
(a) PGD ( = 0.01) (b) PGD ( = 0.05)
Figure 3: Change of classification accuracy on ImageNet validation set (vertical) along with the
number of iterations in PGD attack (horizontal). The bump at iteration = 50 corresponds to a switch
from the ImageNet validation set to a subset of 5,000 images to reduce computation time.
4.2 Performance of a fixed defense under attacks with varying number of iterations
We continue our controlled experiments by setting the parameters of each smoothing defense to the
optimal values obtained in section 4.1 and varying the strength (i.e., number of iterations) of PGD
attacks. Figure 3 presents the classification accuracy on ImageNet validation set as the number of
attack iteration increases from 1 to 100. Surprisingly, the accuracy first drops but then rebounds as the
number of attack iterations keeps increasing. Such performance might seem contradictory to previous
work as we used to believe that more iterations leads to stronger attacks, especially for defenses that
involve adversarial training. For test-time defenses, however, the convex curves may reflect the actual
non-monotonic relation between attacks g and defenses h, as illustrated in Figure 2(b). In contrast,
when no defense is performed, the classification accuracy keeps dropping and stabilizes at a low level.
4.3 Variance of performance among categories
During the experiments, we noticed that the variance of classification accuracy for each category
was quite large. For illustration purposes, we take PGD attack and anisotropic diffusion as an
example. Figure 4(a) shows the sorted accuracies from ImageNet categories. The lowest categorical
accuracy stays below 20% whereas the highest accuracy reaches almost 100%. Similar distribution
of categorical accuracy is observed from other attack-defense pairs. Such an observation leads us
to a question: is it possible to select a relatively large subset of test samples on which a designated
method works the best? The task turns out to be easy. For each smoothing technique, we sort the test
samples that are correctly classified according to their prediction confidence. Then, we can select a
relatively large (with more than 20,000 samples) "optimal" subset with high prediction confidence.
The performance on these optimal subsets are shown in Table 1. For example, the subset at the
first row is selected based on anisotropic diffusion. Therefore, anisotropic diffusion achieves 100%
accuracy while bilateral filters only achieve less than 90%. The optimal subset for each smoothing
technique in this work will be released.
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(a) PGD,  = 0.01 (b) PGD,  = 0.05
Figure 4: Distribution of categorical accuracy on adversarial examples in increasing order. (a):
Results on adversarial examples that are generated from PGD ( = 0.01), with anisotropic diffusion
as defense. (b): same as (a) but the adversarial examples are generated from PGD ( = 0.05).
Table 1: Classification accuracy on “optimal” subsets consisting of adversarial examples generated
from PGD attack ( = 0.01). Accuracies can be inflated to 100% on a dataset with > 104 samples.
"Optimal" subset
Defense Anisotropic diffusion Bilateral Mean
Anisotropic diffusion 100.0% 88.51% 93.79%
Bilateral 92.79% 100% 93.81%
Mean 93.62% 89.31% 100%
4.4 Variance of required defense for test samples
Both non-monotonic relations in section 4.1 and large variance in section 4.3 suggest the idea of
an adaptive version of the test-time smoothing defense, which is favorable for iterative methods.
Specifically, an optimal iteration number or termination criterion is required for each adversarial
example. In order to demonstrate the potential advantage of the adaptive method, we compute
the minimum number of iterations required for defending an adversarial example. Figure 5 shows
the histograms of minimum iterations required with anisotropic diffusion under two sets of PGD
attacks. In addition, the upper bound of the minimum iteration number is set to 30. In other words, if
an adversarial sample remains misclassified throughout 30 smoothing iterations, we consider it as
undefendable. We then compute an upper-bound accuracy for the defense by taking account results
from all iterations. Compared with the result from a fixed iteration number over the whole dataset,
our simulation of the “adaptive method” enhance the accuracy from 72.2% to 83.6% on adversarial
examples generated by PGD ( = 0.01) and from 55.5% to 70.1% on adversarial examples generated
by PGD ( = 0.05). Designing and implementing the adaptive algorithm is left for future work.
(a) PGD ( = 0.01) minimum iteration (b) PGD ( = 0.05) minimum iteration
Figure 5: Minimum number of iterations required for defending adversarial examples
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5 Discussion
In this work, we present the non-monotonic relation between adversarial attacks and test-time defenses.
The huge variance of classification accuracy on adversarial samples may cast doubts on previous work
with unpublished or relatively small datasets, as selecting a large-scale dataset to inflate accuracy
for a particular defense is feasible. For this reason, we did not argue the superiority of a single
defense. As already stated in previous sections, the effectiveness of test-time smoothing defenses
rely on a strong assumption that adversarial images are more noisy than clean samples. Such an
assumption, however, may not be valid for more advanced attacks in the future. Based on results from
our experiment, test-time smoothing is helpful in defending exisiting white-box untargeted attacks.
There are a few failed attempts that are worth reporting. Edge-preserving smoothing techniques
do not necessarily outperform common filters because they may also preserve structural details in
strong noise. In addition, multi-channel smoothing techniques are not superior to channel-by-channel
smoothing filters. Different from the feature denoising at adversarial training, feature smoothing at
test time becomes less useful once the smoothing is sufficient at the image domain.
We hope this paper will stimulate more detailed analysis on adversarial examples at a finer scale.
Future work includes investigating and comparing characteristics of defendable and undefendable
adversarial examples, as well as constructing robust and adaptive termination criteria for each test
sample. In addition, a more comprehensive metric is needed for the evaluation of defenses.
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